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Are Reactors Like Casinos?
A Culture of Dependency in Japan

By J. Mark Ramseyer*

Abstract: Japanese communities with nuclear reactors have the reactors
because they applied for them, and they applied for them for the money. Among
Japanese municipalities, they were some of the most dysfunctional before the
reactors had even arrived. Communities depend on young families for the social
capital that holds them intact, and these were the communities from which those
families had already begun to leave. After the reactors arrived, young families
continued to disappear. Unemployment rose. Divorce rates climbed. And in
time, the communities had little -- other than reactor-revenue -- to which they
could turn.
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It is a sensitive subject.
And it is a subject where readers can lose themselves quickly in partisan
attacks. Consider the native American reservations. Social scientists routinely
detail unusually high levels of violence and child abuse. And some observers
plausibly attribute the dysfunction to the large amounts transferred through
government- and casino-related subsidies.
"Whether it's money from
Washington to pay for housing or food or fuel costs, or whether it's annuities
coming from gaming endeavors," complains journalist Naomi Shaffer Riley (2016,
179), "it has caused more problems than it has solved." The revenue has created a
debilitating "culture of dependency."
Political scientist -- yes, political scientist -- Charles Murray (1993)
attributes the dissolution of the inner-city family to a similar dynamic. The
generous "welfare package" reduces incentives to marry; with marriages less
common the normative structure -- Murray calls it the "proximate culture" -supporting the family fractures; long-term marriages become the exception; and
children grow up without a father. Murray may not use the phrase, but the
concept is the same: large transfer payments create a culture of dependency.
The young Daniel Patrick Moynihan famously found himself in a
firestorm when someone leaked his confidential White House report about the
African American family. He had detailed the rising illegitimacy rates, and
argued that the collapse of the family would bring with it a panoply of social
pathologies. Readers were outraged: Moynihan was "blaming the victim."
Academic accounts of the Japanese nuclear industry mirror the academic
attacks on Riley, on Murray, on Moynihan. Among his critics, Moynihan (1968:
31) noted "a near-obsessive concern to locate the 'blame' for poverty ... on forces
and institutions outside the community concerned." Murray generates much the
same reaction. Yet exactly the same instinct drives many critics of Japanese
nuclear power: too often, they attribute the reactors to the machinations of shortsided politicians, of nuclear specialists ("genpatsu mura," in Japanese), or of the
electrical utility industry. To entertain the possibility that a town might have a
reactor because its residents simply wanted it there would be to blame the victim.
Yet Japanese reactors are indeed in the communities where the voters
asked for them. They are not where they are because the government declared
they would go there, or because the local utility outmaneuvered protestors. They
are there because the voters deliberately requested them. The Japanese
government pays communities lavishly if they opt to take reactors, and some
communities apply for the reactors for the money. The communities that request
these reactors are a decidedly non-random sample, and non-random in ways one
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Samuels (1987, ch. 6) and Aldrich (2008) are clear exceptions to this rule. Samuels
carefully analyzes the development of the incentive structures that would cause communities to
apply for reactors. Aldrich clearly notes that the communities "volunteer" for the reactors.
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could easily characterize as a "culture of dependency." And once built, the
reactors drive many of the same pathologies as the modern reservation casino -and exacerbate yet more the dependency culture.
The logic is simple. People choose whether to apply for a reactor on the
basis of their personal endowments and constraints; given the presence of a
reactor, they choose whether to stay in a community or leave; and given the
reactor and the resulting (very selective) migration patterns, firms decide
whether to locate their facilities in the community. At least three consequences
follow:
First, people with the shortest time horizons vote for the reactors, and
choose to stay if the community receives one. Reactors offer very high shortterm returns, but virtually no long-term benefits. They pay large government
subsidies and tax revenues in the early years, but not in the late. They bring high
long-term perceived health risks, but few (other than the tsunami generated
melt-down) short-term. They cause what many people perceive (accurately or
not) to be cancer risks from long-term exposure to low-level radiation, but not
from just a year or two.
Second, people with the highest private-sector wages are least likely to
stay in a reactor town. Because the reactors pay high subsidies, residents will
leave if but only if jobs in other towns offer pay (and other amenities) greater
than the sum of their local wages and reactor subsidies (net of the obvious
disamenities). Necessarily, people with unusually high levels of human capital
are most likely to offer their services on the national market to the highest bidder
-- and mostly likely to find it advantageous to ignore the subsidies and leave
town.
Last, modern-sector employers are more likely to invest in towns without
a reactor than in those with them. Because parents with young children bring
longer time horizons, they are more likely to leave a nuclear town than older
people. Given that parents disproportionately generate the social capital that
holds a community together, reactor towns are less likely to offer the social
stability that firms want before they invest in a community. And because
workers with the highest levels of human capital will disproportionately leave,
reactor towns are also less likely to offer the educated, talented employees firms
want for their managerial ranks.
Restated, reactors will drive away young families and skilled workers.
Because young families build social capital, their exodus drives down the human
networks that hold the town together. Because highly skilled workers are the
most likely to find jobs elsewhere that offset the nuclear subsidies, the reactors
will also drive away the most able workers. With less social and human capital,
the nuclear towns will find it harder to attract new employers. The towns that
choose to apply for reactors anyway will tend to be those whose citizens exhibit
the attributes (e.g., high discount rates, and human capital that generates lower
returns from private-sector employment) collectively described as a "culture of
dependency."
When the reactor arrives, that reactor will increase the
dependency further still.
In the article that follows, I ask whether the evidence is consistent with
this logic. I start by measuring the effect that a reactor can have on a community.
To do so, I first create a 30-year municipality-level panel data set. I then use
simple fixed-effect regressions to examine the way communities change as a
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utility introduces a reactor (Section I). Given that the communities that apply for
the reactors are not a random sample, I repeat the exercise with a matched
sample in the spirit of a simple regression-discontinuity design. Toward that end,
I limit my sample to those communities that either received a reactor or applied
for a reactor but (for whatever reason) never received it. I run the same fixedeffect regressions (Section II). I close by examing more closely the communities
that applied for the reactors (Section III).
I. Reactors as Casinos
A. The Exercise:
1. Introduction. -- I start with an apparently straightforward exercise:
construct a three-decade, municipality-level panel dataset of various social
capital indices, and explore the impact that a nuclear power plant can have on a
community. Toward this end, I compile data on several variables from 1980 to
2010. In each case, I obtain the data for all 1,742 municipalities. Given that Japan
has no unincorporated areas, they cover the entire country. Where municipal
boundaries have shifted, I use data that reconstruct the values based on current
borders. I treat Tokyo as a prefecture, and its composite wards as municipalities.
I include selected summary statistics in Table 1.
[Insert Table 1 about here.]
2. Nuclear plants. -- I measure the social effect of nuclear plants through
three key independent variables. They identify whether a power company has
announced its plans for a nuclear plant, whether it has begun construction, and
whether it has started to operate the reactor. If a municipality has an operating
reactor and announces plans for an additional one, I ignore the new reactor and
code the municipality as having an operating plant. I take the information from
Gensuikin (2013: 14-17).
Plan: 1 if a power company has announced plans to build a nuclear
plant in the municipality, 0 otherwise.
Construction: 1 if a power company has begun construction of a
nuclear plant in the municipality, 0 otherwise.
Operation: 1 if a power company has begun operating a nuclear
plant in the municipality, 0 otherwise.
3. Other variables. -- I take the other municipality-year panel variables
from a variety of government sources. For each variable, I calculate the per
capita measure by the population statistics given in Somusho, Kokusei (various
years; per 1000 population). Given that the government compiles population
data only every five years, I interpolate the intervening years.
2
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The data can be downloaded from the standard government website http://www.estat.go.jp/SG1/chiiki/ToukeiDataSelectDispatchAction.do.
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Revenue PC: Municipal revenues (sai'nyu kessan sogaku), per
capita. Data from Somusho, Shichoson (various years).
Under 15 PC: The number of people under age 15, per capita. Data
from the Somusho, Kokusei (various years).
Over 64 PC: The number of people over age 64, per capita. Data
from Somusho, Kokusei (various years).
Unemployment PC: Number of unemployed workers, divided by
the 15-65 year-old population. The calculation applies only to workers
over age 15, and excludes those who deliberately opt out of the organized
labor market. Data from Somusho, Kokusei (various years).
Marriages PC: The number of marriages, per capita. Data from
Kosei, Jinko (various years).
Population: the population as given in Somusho, Kokusei (various
years; per 1000 population). The government compiles population data
only every five years; intervening years are interpolated.
In-migration PC: The number of in-migrants, per capita (not net of
out-migrants). Data from Somusho, Jumin (various years).
Out-migration PC: The number of out-migrants, per capita (not
net of in-migrants). Data from Somusho, Jumin (various years).
Divorce Rate: The number of divorces, divided by the number of
marriages. Data from Kosei, Jinko (various years).
Throughout, I use municipality fixed effects and year fixed effects. I cluster the
errors by municipality.
B. Results:
1. Revenue. -- To reward a community for taking a reactor, the
government pays lavish subsidies. I detail the revenue more carefully in Section
III below. Note here that the government begins making substantial transfer
payments as soon as construction begins (See Table 2). When I regress
government revenue on reactor construction and operation, the coefficients are
large and significant. As the second and third columns in Table 2 show, they are
also robust to the inclusion of controls for demographic and unemployment
variation.
[Insert Table 2 about here.]
2.
Demographics. -- According to Table 3, nuclear plants cause
communities to atrophy. As they accept the plants, people disappear. Perhaps
some move away. When the elderly die, perhaps insufficient young people
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move to the community to take their place (Table 3).
population falls.

Whatever the cause,

3

[Insert Table 3 about here.]
Nuclear plants also cause communities to age. Necessarily, the perceived
radiation risks fall most heavily on the young. Other than the catastrophic
meltdown, the perceived risk from a reactor (largely, a cancer risk -- I take no
position on whether the perception is accurate) accrues over several decades. For
couples with young children, those risks can seem huge. For couples already
retired, they will be more modest. Should a community accept a reactor, young
parents will find it a far less attractive place to raise their children. Older couples
may not much care. .
For social capital, however, intact young families are crucial. As Murray
(2012, 165) put it, "families with children are the core" of well-functioning
communities. Older couples may bring attitudes that value community, but as
they age they withdraw and live increasing isolated lives. Older couples do not
volunteer at the PTA. They do not coach soccer teams, and do not help at the
local library. The young parents do. They -- not the retired couples -- contribute
in the countless other ways that help a community cohere. Precisely because of
the long-term nature of the risks to nuclear power, however, the young parents
are residents most threatened by a reactor.
Table 4 reflects this dynamic. Once a power company announces plans to
build a reactor, young families disappear. The fraction of children under age 15
falls while that of people over 64 rises (Table 4). The coefficients are significant
and robust to the inclusion of controls for marriage and unemployment rates.
[Insert Table 4 about here.]
3. Unemployment and divorce. -- Given the crucial role that young
families play in maintaining social capital, their disappearance should reduce
community cohesion. Existing employers may leave. New employers may
avoid the town. The most intact couples may move away. As the most
functional couples leave and remaining couples lose their jobs, divorce rates
should rise
Table 5 suggests -- albeit inconclusively -- that the reactors may indeed
cause employers to stay away. In a simple regression on the three reactor
variables, the coefficients are positive but insignificant. With the addition of
controls for migration, the positive coefficient on the operation of the reactor
becomes significant at the 5 percent level.
[Insert Table 5 about here.]
Table 6 suggests that the reactors may raise divorce rates. Once a utility
starts to construct a reactor, divorce rates climb. The coefficients on the other
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Note that because the census occurs only five years, I use interpolated values for the
intervening years. This will cause the statistical significance to be exaggerated.
3

Ramseyer: Page 7
periods are insignificant, but the increase in divorce rates during construction is
robust to the inclusion of demographic and employment controls.
[Insert Table 6 about here.]
II. Matched Sample
A. Introduction:
According to Tables 2 through 6, reactors cause communities to
deteriorate. Reactors are like casinos, as a friend once put it. Regress proxies for
social cohesion on the presence of nuclear reactors, and the level of cohesion falls.
Yet the regressions leave a nagging worry. Power companies did not
select the sites for their nuclear reactors (see Table 7) randomly. Neither did the
communities apply for reactors randomly. Instead, the decision to take a reactor
is arguably endogenous to the level of social capital (as noted in Ando 2015, 69).
Community dysfunction may seem to follow the arrival of a casino -- but
perhaps the casino arrived because the community had turned dysfunctional
already.
[Insert Table 7 about here.]
B. The Approach:
Consider then a simple study in the spirit of a regression-discontinuity
design. Suppose two sets of communities differed only in the presence of a
reactor. If a utility then allocated its reactors between them randomly,
regressions using the variables in Tables 2 through 6 would indeed identify the
effect that reactors have on the community.
In this spirit, take those communities where a utility initially announced
but then abandoned its plan to build a reactor. Then pair these communities
with those where a utility did ultimately build a reactor, and run regressions
equivalent to those in Tables 2 through 6. Obviously, the result will not
constitute a true regression-discontinuity design. Fate did not allocate the
reactors between the two groups randomly.
Yet, the two sets of municipalities present basic similarities. In both, the
utility thought the community presented a good site. It announced its plans only
after studying the area elaborately. In both, the government at least initially
thought the community an appropriate location too. Again, the utility
announced its plans only after clearing the project with the government. And in
both, many residents wanted the reactor. Once more, the utility filed its plan
only after elected municipal representatives pledged their support.
Whether a utility ultimately built an initially planned reactor turned on a
balance. On the one hand, the outcome turned on (i) how closely the
municipality resembled what the utility and the government considered an ideal
site for a reactor, and on (ii) how badly local supporters wanted the transfer
payments that came with the reactor. On the other, the outcome also turned on
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Shimonoseki city (Shimonoseki prefecture), Kushima city (Miyazaki prefecture), Ise
village and Ooki village (Mie prefecture), Suzu city (Ishikawa prefecture), Niigata city (Niigata
prefecture), Shirahama village (Wakayama prefecture), and Mihama village (Kyoto prefecture) -from Japanese Wikipedia.
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how vehemently the reactor's critics opposed its construction. Where the former
outweighed the latter, the reactor arrived. Where the latter outweighed the
former, it vanished.
Although reactor assignment is not random, the two groups of
communities -- those where a utility ultimately built a reactor, and those where it
did not -- are close. In the loose spirit of a simple regression-discontinuity study,
I match (a) the municipalities where a utility ultimately built a reactor with (b)
the municipalities where it announced plans for a reactor that it ultimately
abandoned. I then re-run the regressions from Tables 2 through 6 on the
matched datasets.
C. The Results:
1. Revenues PC. -- The regressions on the matched-sample database
confirm the earlier results about revenue: once construction begins, the local
government receives large sums of money. In Table 2, I ran the revenue
regressions on the full dataset. In this Table 8, I run them on a dataset that
incudes only those municipalities that either took a reactor or ultimately
abandoned a publicly announced reactor.
[Insert Table 8 about here.]
The coefficients in the matched sample regressions closely track those on
the full database. In both cases, once a utility begins to construct a reactor,
government revenues rise. Both the magnitude and the significance of the
coefficients in the two sets of regressions are close. In both, the results are robust
to the inclusion of demographic and unemployment controls.
5

2. Population. -- The population regressions present a puzzle. In Table 3,
the regressions on the full dataset suggested that municipalities with reactors lost
population. The same regressions on the Table 9 dataset yield no significant
coefficients on the reactor variables.
[Insert Table 9 about here.]
The contrasting results probably track the differences in the two
comparison populations. In Table 3, the regressions compare towns with
reactors to all other municipalities. They suggest that the towns with reactors
lost population relative to the rest of Japan. In Table 9, the regressions compare
reactor-built towns only to the other communities where a utility had formally
filed plans to build a reactor. They suggest that the reactor-built towns did not
lose population faster than these other reactor-planned towns.
At root, the contrasting results probably reflect the fact that the utilities
reached agreements to build reactors primarily only with communities that were
already losing population. As discussed in Section IV below, only badly
dysfunctional towns wanted a reactor. They were disintegrating towns. Some of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Consistent with the results from the "synthetic control" study, Ando (2015).
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those towns received a reactor, and continued to hemorrhage. At the others the
reactor never arrived, but the towns continued to lose population all the same.
6

3. Age distribution. -- Table 4 suggested that the reactors drive away
young families, and Table 10 confirms this observation. Relative to the towns
that rejected a reactor, those that accepted one find children disappearing. Both
in Table 4 and in Table 10, as municipalities accept reactors, families with
children disappear. With lower significance levels, both tables suggest the
converse as well: as municipalities accept reactors, they find themselves
increasingly dominated by the elderly.
[Insert Table 10 about here.]
4. Unemployment. -- The Table 11 regressions indicate that reactors drive
jobs away too. Perhaps existing firms leave. Perhaps new firms hesitate to locate
in the reactor towns. And perhaps industrious workers move elsewhere, leaving
only those unable to and hold a job.
[Insert Table 11 about here.]
Whatever the mix of reasons, the coefficients on the reactor variables in
Table 11 are positive in all specifications. Once the reactors begin operating, the
coefficients are statistically significant as well: reactors cause unemployment
rates to rise.
7

5. Divorce. -- Reactors also cause divorce rates to rise, at least during
construction. The coefficients on the construction variables in Tables 6 and 12 are
positive and statistically significant in all specifications. They are positive for the
operating period as well, even if not at statistically significant levels.
[Include Table 12 about here.]
Perhaps the most intact families move out, and leave less stable couples.
Perhaps higher rates of unemployment add stress. Whatever the reason, in both
Tables 6 and 12, reactors raise the rate of divorce.
III. Reactor Location
A. Plausible Considerations:
1. Introduction. -- To examine more closely the effect that a reactor can
have, turn from the quantitative to the qualitative. From the statistical accounts
in Sections I and II, consider several anecdotes. And where in the regressions I
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6

With the principal exception of the city of Niigata.

By contrast, Ando (2015) uses a "synthetic control" approach, and concludes that nuclear
plants cause per capita income to rise. He notes, however, that the plants lead (predictably) to
employment in the construction sector, that manufacturing employment increased only in one of
the sites; and that the employment results in the service sector are mixed. Note as well that he
obtains the strongest positive economic effect at the Rokkasho complex. This is not a reactor, and
therefore not in my dataset. Rokkasho is instead a fuel reprocessing facility.
7
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examine only those towns that accept their first reactor between 1980 and 2010,
consider as well those that accepted their reactors before 1980.
To examine the decisions siting a reactor, begin with the characteristics on
which the government, the utilities, and the towns would most plausibly rely.
Given that reactors need access to massive amounts of cooling water, one might
expect to see reactors along the coast (Subsec. A.2). Given the radiation risk they
present, one might expect them to see them in sites far from metropolitan centers
(Subsec. A.3). And given the dangers inherent to seismologically unstable
environments, one might expect to see them away from earthquake fault lines
(Subsec. A.4).
2. Coastal access. -- Japanese utilities do indeed build their reactors along
the coast. Reactors require enormous quantities of water to cool the core. In
France (where reactors provide three-quarters of all electric power), the
government locates them along rivers and by the northern coast. Perhaps
because Japanese rivers tend to run fast but narrow, utilities in Japan avoid the
rivers and build their reactors along the coast.
8

3. Seclusion. -- Japanese utilities do not build their reactors in distant sites.
Meltdowns are not trivial events. Given the risks, rational power companies and
government regulators might reasonably locate reactors as far from major cities
as feasible. Japan does have many large cities, but it also has plenty of rural
areas in which the utilities might build their reactors that are far from any urban
center.
Perversely in the extreme, however, Japanese utilities site almost all their
reactors near major metropolitan centers. For example, 35 million people live in
the greater Tokyo metropolitan area. The Japan Atomic Power Co. built the very
first commercial reactor (Tokai 1, in Ibaragi) 80 miles northeast of the center of
the city (Yoshioka 2011, 108). Tokyo Electric built its 10 Fukushima reactors 160
miles from Tokyo, and Chubu Electric built the 4 Hamaoka reactors 150 miles
away. The 14 Fukui reactors (one of them a fast breeder reactor) lie 70 miles from
greater Kyoto (with its 2.7 million residents) and 80 miles from Osaka (with 12
million). The 3 Ikata reactors sit 90 miles from Hiroshima (with 1.4 million); the 3
Tomari reactors are 60 miles from Sapporo (with 2.4 million); the 3 Onagawa
reactors are 50 miles from Sendai (with 1.6 million); and the 4 Genkai reactors are
45 miles from Fukuoka (with 2.6 million). The 4 Hamaoka reactors lying 150
miles from Tokyo are also 105 miles from Nagoya (with a population of 5.5
million), 36 miles from Shizuoka (with 990,000), and 25 miles from Hamamatsu
(with 1.1 million).
9

4. Earthquakes. -- (a) Introduction. Neither do Japanese utilities shun
earthquake fault lines. Again, rational utilities and regulators might reasonably
build reactors as far from faults as possible. The danger is obvious. Pressurized
reactors are risky enough when they run uranium. Japanese utilities equip many
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

The complex riparian water rights also make negotiations over the requisite water
extremely costly. Nagai (2015, 39); see Ramseyer (1989).
8

9

Some American reactors are also remarkably close to urban centers.
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to run on more dangerous plutonium-enriched fuel besides. To be sure, Japan
lies on the boundary between two plates. Nowhere is as far from a fault as
Dorothy's Kansas. Yet even within Japan, not all areas experience as many
earthquakes as others.
Yet consider the three most productive reactor sites: Fukushima, Niigata,
and Fukui.
(b) Fukushima. Pre-2011, the 10 reactors in Fukushima produced 9.1
million kWatts of electricity, 22 percent of total Japanese nuclear capacity (Table
7). Yet Tokyo Electric sited these reactors on a coast that massive tsunami assail
every century (Table 13). This coast along northeastern Japan faced a 39 meter
tsunami in 2011, a 38 meter tsunami in 1938, and a 28 meter tsunami in 1896.
[Insert Table 13 about here.]
Earthquakes hit this coast often and hard. Catastrophic 8+ quakes shake it
once a century: in 2011, 1933, 1896, 1793, and 1611 (Table 13). Still deadly
magnitude 7+ quakes hit several times a century: 2011, 2008, 1978, 1960, and
1938 (Table 14). Writing in 1934, Akitune Imamura (1934, 79) of the Tokyo
Imperial University Seismological Institute noted that "the eastern coast of the
locality popularly known as the San-Riku [district, just north of Fukushima] is
well known from historic times as the region frequently visited by tunami."
Indeed, he continued, "it is most notorious in this country, if not in the whole
world."
10

[Insert Table 14 about here.]
(c) Niigata. In Niigata prefecture, the twin cities of Kashiwazaki and
Kariwa house 7 reactors producing 8.2 million kWatts, or 19.5 percent of pre2011 nuclear capacity (Table 7). Niigata's western coast faces fewer earthquakes
than Fukushima's east, but even the west experiences some. The 7 KashiwazakiKariwa reactors lie between two separate areas specially designated by the
government as at high risk of magnitude 8+ earthquakes (Kansoku n.d.). During
the first decade of this century, two magnitude 6.8 and one 6.9 earthquakes
struck the prefecture, and together killed 87 people (Table 14). At the reactor
complex, fire broke out and radioactive water leaked (Kashiwazaki 2007;
Kainuma 2011, 98-99; Yoshioka 2011, 346-47).
(d) Fukui. The 10 reactors in Fukui prefecture generate 11.6 million
kWatts, 27 percent of the pre-2011 Japanese capacity. To date they have escaped
major earthquake damage, but only barely. Since the late 1800s, three magnitude
7+ earthquakes have hit the prefecture. The last -- in 1948 -- killed 3,700 (Table 9).
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
The magnitude 8.1 earthquake of 1933 was centered 200 km off shore. On the Japan
coast, it registered only magnitude 5. Largely as a result of the tsunami, 1500 people died,
another 1500 disappeared, and 12,000 were injured. Most of the deaths and disappearances were
in Iwate prefecture.
10
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(e) Other. Japanese utilities have built their other 25 reactors in a variety
of places, but many of them in places that raise their own seismological doubts.
Chubu Electric, for example, did not just build its 4 Hamaoka reactors 150 miles
west of Tokyo; it built them directly over the "Suruga Trough." Government
seismologists predict a magnitude 8 quake on the trough within the next few
decades -- by some accounts, a 70 percent chance that it will hit within 30 years,
and a 90 percent chance within 50 years (Shirundo 2017). Seismologists have
already named it the upcoming "Great Tokai Earthquake" (Staffblog 2017; Sandee
2004). In the past, the fault generated magnitude 8+ earthquakes every 100 to
160 years -- most recently in 1498, 1707, and 1854.
Chubu Electric knew the Hamaoka risks when it made its plans,
complains prominent University of Tokyo seimologist Kiyoo Moro, and made
them anyway (Sundee 2004):
It won't do to say, "we didn't know about the Tokai earthquake risk
at the time." I pointed out the "risk of a massive magnitude 8 earthquake
in the Tokai area" back in November 1969. That was six months before
Chubu Electric even applied for the permit on Hamaoka Reactor 1. I
pointed it out at the monthly meeting of the University of Tokyo
Earthquake Research, ... and it became a major news story. It made both
the national Mainichi and Asahi newspapers, and the NHK and private
broadcast networks.
Moro recalled two senior Chubu Electric officers who had visited him three years
earlier (Sundee 2004):
I asked them, "why didn't you ask me what I thought?" "I don't
know about back then," one of them replied. "But I'd guess they figured
that if they consulted you, you'd berate them and declare that "you can't
possibly build a reactor there."
Critics claim the 3 Ikata reactors sit directly on an active fault as well.
They point to the nearby "Central Fault" (Sai kado 2016). The reactors do indeed
lie within one of the government-designated special observation zones at risk of
a magnitude 8+ earthquake (Kansoku n.d.).
The 2 Shimane reactors similarly lie within a special magnitude 8+
observation zone.
B. A Culture of Dependency
1. Introduction. -- Japanese utilities build their reactors along the coast.
They do not avoid metropolitan centers. And they do not avoid earthquake fault
lines. Hence, the question remains: how do Japanese utilities actually choose
their sites?
Japanese utilities locate their reactors in towns that bring high discount
rates, human capital valued low in the private sector -- and the resulting
portfolio of characteristics commonly called a "culture of dependency." A small
number of sites produce the bulk of Japanese nuclear power. Although Japan
has 52 reactors, they do not sit in 52 locations. Rather, they sit in 18. But even
the number 18 misleads. The three complexes in Fukushima, Niigata, and Fukui
produced over 65 percent of all Japanese nuclear power.
As different as these three communities are on some dimensions, they
shared a deeply rooted culture of dependency. It is not just that they are poor.
They are indeed poor, but much -- if not most -- of rural Japan is poor. Most

Ramseyer: Page 13
poor rural Japanese communities do not request nuclear reactors. These three
did.
For decades before they turned to nuclear power, these towns almost
reflexively vied for government transfer payments. Theirs was not an instinct to
innovate or produce. It was an instinct to lobby and extract. For them, the
reactors were simply their last play in a long chain of government subsidies.
2. Fukushima. -- Tokyo Electric built the first of its Fukushima reactors in
1971 (see Table 7). Over the next several decades, it would build 9 more. It
would allocate them between two sites -- Daiichi (meaning Number One) and
Daini (Number Two) -- but the sites effectively constituted one complex. It built
the first site in the towns of Okuma and Futaba, and the second in Naraha and
Tomioka, but Futaba and Tomioka are adjacent towns. When operating, the 10
Fukushima reactors had produced 9.1 million kWatts.
Fukushima is a land of shuttered mines. Pre-war Japanese industry had
run on coal, and industries in Tokyo had relied heavily on the mines in
Fukushima (known by the regional name, "Joban" mines). Firms had used the
coal for railroads, for cotton spinning factories, for ocean shipping (Kiyomiya
1955, app. tab.). The government had used it for military vehicles. The mines in
northern Kyushu and Hokkaido had yielded more and higher quality coal. But
given their proximity to Tokyo, the Fukushima mines offered a better price (Ishii
2003).
As the Second World War neared the end, so did the place for coal.
During the first decade after the war, Japanese coal mines employed over 450,000
workers. By 1963, they employed only 123,000, by 1970 48,000, and by 1975
23,000 (Table 15). By the early years of the 21st century, they barely employed
1000. In 1952, coal firms operated 1,047 mines. By the 21st century, in all of
Japan they ran only 8 (Keizai 2009, 5; see Samuels 1987, ch. 3).
[Insert Table 15 about here.]
Joban tracked this national decline. Between 1955 and 1968, the Joban
firms closed 87 mines. They shut the last underground mine in 1976, and the last
open-air unit in 1985. In 1948, they had employed 39,600 mine workers. By 1972
they employed 1,700, and by 1976 only 68 (Ishii 2003; see Ohara 1956, 6).
From the national government, however, the coal firms, towns, and
workers extracted elaborate transfers. Already in the 1950s, the government
controlled coal pricing. In time, it would pay firms to shutter mines that lost
money anyway. It would pay firms to hire former coal miners (Ishii 2003;
Waseda 2009; Keizai 2009, 8-10).
By the 1960s, the Fukushima towns had learned their lesson well: to
weather fiscal distress, lobby the state. When they exhausted their coal revenues,
they turned to the government for subsidies. When they exhausted their coal
subsidies, they turned to nuclear power. And to keep that nuclear revenue
flowing, they asked Tokyo Electric to add one reactor after another (Namie n.d.,
7).
3. Niigata.-- The second mega-complex lies in Niigata, along the coast of
the Japan Sea. Here, mountains climb steeply toward the eastern edge of the
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prefecture. Having swept through Siberia, the winds absorb moisture over the
Japan Sea, hit these mountains, and drop massive precipitation: hard rains in the
summer, bitter snow in winter. In 1937, Yasunari Kawabata set Snow Country -his stark but haunting tale of an aging hot springs geisha -- in Niigata, and for it
in 1968 would win the Nobel Prize. Given the latitude, wrote his translator
Edward Seidensticker (1956, v), Niigata is probably "the snowiest region in the
world." A "cross between Mississippi and Vermont," political scientist Chalmers
Johnson (1986, 3) called it, "the part of the country that supplies workers,
electricity, and rice (and that used to supply geisha and ricksha pullers) for ... the
Tokyo megalopolis ...."
"At the turn of the century Niigata prefecture was the most densely
populated prefecture in all of Japan," continued Johnson (1986, 3):
but by 1972, ... it had been virtually depopulated. The heavy snows,
normally about 15 feet, made the pace close to impassable in winter, and
most of the men had to set out on ... seasonal work in the big cities. ...
Until very recently the children of small-town and rural Niigata lived in
school dormitories if they attended school at all, and the only people left
at home were mothers and old women.
Within this "snow country," two towns house seven reactors:
Kashiwazaki and Kariwa. Kashiwazaki is a small city of 86,200. Kariwa is the
adjacent town of 4,700. In these two communities, Tokyo Electric built a complex
that generates 8.2 million kWatts.
Kashiwazaki and Kariwa had once produced oil. They still do. But as
Japan switched from coal to petroleum in the 1950s, the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa oil
looked increasingly trivial next to the amount imported. In 1970, domestic
Japanese wells produced 901,000 kl, and in 2014 626,000. Niigata produced 60
percent of that 2014 total, but of all Japanese consumption the domestically
pumped oil came to barely 0.3 percent.
For nearly half a century, Kashiwazaki and Kariwa elected and re-elected
Kakuei Tanaka, the greatest pork-barrel politician of all time. Tanaka had been
born in Kariwa in 1918. He married money, and then parlayed those funds into a
larger fortune in Korea during the last chaotic months of the war. The local
electoral district included both Kariwa and Kashiwazaki, and in 1947 its voters
sent Tanaka to the parliament. After stints as Minister of International Trade &
Industry and Minister of Finance, Tanaka became Prime Minister in 1972. By
1983, the courts would sentence him to four years in prison for taking bribes
from Lockheed (and giving rise to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act), but never
mind. Voters continued to elect him anyway (16 successive terms in all), until he
retired in 1990.
11
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Nihon sekiyu to Hokuetsu Kashiwazaki [Japan Petroleum and Hokuetsu Kashiwazaki],
Nakamura sekiyu K.K., available at: http://www.nakamura-oil.co.jp/n_h.html (accessed Dec. 5,
2016); Gen'yu seisan no kirifuda [The Trump to Crude Production], available at:
http://www.chem-station.com/blog/2015/07/oil.html (accessed Jan. 26, 2017); dai28 hyo
[genyu, kaigai jishu kaihatsu gen'yu yunyu ryo to kokunai seisan ryo no suii [Tab. 28: Crude Oil:
Trends in Quantity of Crude Produced Overseas and Imported, and Quantity Produced
Domestically], available at http://www.noe.jx-group.co.jp/binran/data/pdf/28.pdf (accessed
Jan. 26, 2017)
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On behalf of his Kashiwazaki and Kariwa voters, Tanaka turned the
national government into a perpetual revenue machine. He promised to send his
constituents "highways, schools, reclamation projects, tunnels, railroads, and
snow removal services in return for their votes," explained Johnson (1986, 4),
"and that's exactly what he did." He double-tracked the railroad to this cross
between Vermont and Missippi. He brought the spectacular bullet train: 300 km
of wide-guage track, 100 km of tunnels, and five special stations, all at a cost of
480 billion yen. In 1962, Niigata received 12.1 billion yen in national subsidies.
By 1965 it received 24.1 billion, and in 1970 53.3 billion. By the time Tanaka
became prime minister in 1972, Niigata collected subsidies worth 80.6 billion yen.
In 1982, Tokyo residents paid $3,060 in taxes for per capita public works of $815.
Niigata residents paid $541 in taxes and received $1,644 (Ramseyer & Rosenbluth
1993, 123; Johnson 1986, 8).
For Tanaka, the reactors were merely the means to send his constituents
more money. Sumio Habara (2012) reported for the Asahi shimbun newspaper:
Kashiwazaki had been a prosperous town centered on the oil and
machine industries. Both involved firms founded by local residents:
Nihon Seikyu (now, New Japan Oil) and Riken [a piston ring firm] (Riken
kakgaku kenkyujo). Yet both also disintegrated after the war. Only sand
dunes separated Kashiwazaki and Kariwa. Together, they suffered
depopulation, blizzards, and financial distress. Nuclear power was the
way they chose to escape this pit.
And so it was that Tanaka delivered the reactors.
4. Fukui. -- Fukui had already turned to nuclear power before Fukushima.
The industry had opened its very first reactor 100 miles northeast of Tokyo in
1966. It opened the second and third reactors in 1970, and placed them in Fukui
(see Nagai, et al. 2015, 37-38; Yoshioka 2011, 150). Over the next two decades, the
industry would build a series of reactors in five closely located Fukui sites. And
by 1991, the government would add a fast breeder reactor running (in part) on
deadly plutonium.
Fukui is a small prefecture south of Niigata along the Japan Sea coast.
With a population of 803,000, it lies some 60 miles from the historic capital of
Kyoto and 80 miles from massive Osaka. From one end to the other, Fukui's 13
reactors span 50 miles. The first two went into operation in 1970. The last began
operating in 1993. The utilities placed some of the reactors in a city of 68,000
(Tsuraga). The others they sited in towns that ranged from 9,200 residents to
11,800. Together, the reactors produced 11.3 million kWatts (Table 7).
During the first half of the 20th century, Fukui had served as a center to
high-end Japanese textiles. The cotton firms located many of their factories
elsewhere, but the Fukui firms wove silk fabric for the export market. By 1907,
that silk fabric constituted 38.7 percent of prefectural GDP (Tomizawa 2005, 18).
When the demand for silk fell, Fukui firms turned to rayon, and by 1937 all fabric
together accounted for 66.8 percent of prefectural output (Tomizawa 2005, 22).
With the close of the Second World War, firms shifted yet again: this time, to
thermoplastics like nylon and polyester (Tomizawa 2005, 25; Takemi et al. n.d.
37).
Already by the 1950s, however, the Fukui textile firms had begun to rely
on government transfers. The strategy would reshape the prefecture entirely. At
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the behest of the firms, the government began restricting new investment in
textile machinery. It limited production, and bought and scrapped equipment
(Ike 1980, 538-40). Between just 1956 and 1959, it bought 14,000 looms from the
Fukui firms (Tomizawa 2005, 26).
Fukui textiles peaked during the early 1960s. In 1960, 61 percent of Fukui
employees still worked in the industry (Tomizawa 2005, 25), but contraction
began within the decade (Table 16). As it did, the government lavished yet more
subsidies on the industry. The Diet passed textile-specific statutes in 1967, 1969,
1972, 1974, 1979, 1984, 1989, and 1994 (Shirato 2009-10, 7; Tomizawa 2005, 29 et
seq.; Ike 1980, 538-39). And when it acceded to U.S. demands for export
restrictions in the early 1970s, it paid another 205 billion yen (Itami 2001, 283; see
Ike 1980, 540 (different numbers)).
[Insert Table 16 about here.]
The result was an approach to distress that fed dependence. Given the
government's willingness to buy "excess" equipment, observed scholar Brian Ike
(1980, 546), firms faced a "negative incentive for shifting resources out of the
industry." Rather than shrink the industry, the programs caused "a perpetual
problem of surplus capacity." In the process, they created what management
scholar Hiroyuki Itami (2001, 18-19) called the "frightful result," a perpetual
culture of "dependence" (id., 17-18):
Japanese textile policy during the 1970s and 1980s rigidified the
industry's dependence on government. Given the policy, the industry
never developed the energy necessary to shift its structure and become
internationally competitive.
Firms had no incentive to transform their structure when "the government
transferred vast sums to the textile industry" (Itami 2001, 18-19). By protecting
the firms, the government created a "dependence on government regulation."
Each step, Itami (2001, 18-19) continued, "unintentionally gave rise to the next
policy of dependence.
5. Demographic implications. -- This deepening culture of dependence
coincided with demographic decline. The towns were declining even as they
turned to political manipulation, and they have continued to decline since. Most
obviously, they were and are towns that hemorrhaged people (Table 17).
Consider again the three key prefectures of Fukushima, Niigata, and Fukui, and
take just the data since 1980. Two of the Fukushima towns at issue did not lose
people over the course of 1980-2010. All other reactor-towns in Fukushima,
Fukui, and Niigata did. The prefectures themselves lost population, but the
towns housing reactors lost an even greater percentage than the rest of the
prefecture.
[Insert Table 17 about here.]
These nuclear towns have also been aging. The two Fukushima towns
that did not lose population also did not age: they maintain a lower fraction of
the population over 64 than even Japan as a whole (Table 18). All other
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municipalities with reactors have a fraction over 64 larger than the national
average, and -- other than Tsuruga -- larger even than the prefectural average.
[Insert Table 18 about here.]
B. The Funds:
1. The money. -- The towns and villages that volunteered for the reactors
volunteered for the money. And at least for the initial years, the government
brandished lavish amounts. Suppose a town took a nuclear plant that produced
1.35 million kWatts, suggested the Ministry of Economy, Trade & Industry
(Keizai 2011, 4). The wattage itself was not unreasonable. The Fukushima Daini
reactors produced a mean 1.1 million kWatts (Table 7). The town could expect:
Years 1-3: While the utility ran its environmental impact studies,
the town would receive 520 million yen per year.
Year 4: As the utility began construction, the town would receive
annual subsidies of up to 7.92 billion yen -- at the January 4, 2011
exchange rate of 81.96 yen/$, about $96.6 million. Local firms and
citizens would earn additional money by selling land, working in
construction, or selling other services related to the project.
Years 5-10: As the construction continued, the subsidies would
climb to 8.23 billion yen in each of the next two years. Thereafter, they
would begin to decline: to 6.64 billion for two years, and 4.4 billion in the
next two.
Operation: Once the utility started operating the reactor, the
annual subsidies would fall further. For the next two decades, the
government will pay about 2 billion yen a year.
As the subsidies declined, however, the property taxes began. As one
observer (Ito 2011) calculated it, a 1.25 million kWatt reactor a utility would
initially pay about 6.3 billion yen.
12

2. The problem. -- It is good money. Unfortunately for the town, it does
not last. Table 19 details the subsidies, and they are indeed large. In Kariwa,
they come to $3,000 per person. In one Fukui town they exceed $4,000 per
person. Yet although government initially pays lavish subsidies, the amounts
fall. Even the property tax does not last. The tax code assigns reactors a 16-year
useable life. Under the resulting depreciation schedule, the tax falls to half the
initial amount by year five (Ito 2011; Namie n.d., 7).
[Insert Table 19 about here.]
So it is that the towns that take one reactor soon ask for a second. Under
the earliest versions of the subsidy programs, the government earmarked the
money for construction projects. Some communities that took the money found
themselves needing another reactor just to maintain their new buildings.
Program amendments eventually ameliorated this problem, but the question of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Excellent discussions of the subsidy legislation appear in Samuels (1987, ch. 6) and
Aldrich (2008).
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"nuclear addiction" (as critics phrase it) remains: once a community begins
programs based on nuclear revenue, it may soon need another reactor just to
keep the programs going.
The nuclear mega-complexes follow. As one Kashiwazaki city council
member put it (Kasako 2012), "unless we keep building new reactors, the
revenues stop. Our population doesn't increase. Neither does the number of
firms in the city. Instead, the reactors just drive the firms away." Invite a reactor
in, and soon little more than the government revenue remains. The Fukushima
town of Futaba had six reactors (the Daiichi complex). By the 1990s, it was
asking Tepco to build two more (Kato, et al. 2013). Since 2011, it has been a ghost
town, and so it will remain indefinitely.
3. Kashiwazaki. -- Take Kashiwazaki and Kariwa. Under Prime Minister
Tanaka's pork-barrel patronage, the towns applied for their first reactor in 1969.
Tokyo Electric placed it in service in 1985. The towns now found themselves
with massively fluctuating revenues. In 1998, Kariwa received subsidies of 5.8
billion yen. In 2000 it received 25 million yen, and in 2001 it received 0 (Table
20).
13

[Insert Table 20 about here.]
When an earthquake struck Niigata in 2007, Kashiwazaki found itself
facing large rebuilding costs. Yet the subsidies had largely come to a close, and
the property taxes were declining rapidly. By 2011, it was spending more than it
received (Ikeda n.d.; see Kasako 2012). It owed 60 billion yen, and interest on
that debt constituted 24.1 percent of its municipality expenses. As of 2016, the
debt remained. Per capita, the debt came to 614,000 yen per person -- but
Kashiwazaki lacked people who could earn money to pay it down: 38.9 percent
of its citizens were 65 or older (Ikeda n.d.; Goo 2016; Usami 2014).
III. Conclusions:
Reactors degrade communities.
In Japan, they do not arrive by
government fiat. They do not arrive by the devious machinations of a
manipulative utility.
Instead, in Japan communities apply for reactors. They apply for a simple
reason: the government pays towns that accept reactors massive resources.
Disproportionately, the towns that apply for the reactors are dystopian worlds
already. They are the towns that lost their principal industry, their best workers,
and many of their families, and had responded by shifting from private-sector
entrepreneurship to public-sector rent seeking. By the simple mechanics of
selective migration, they were towns that acquired a culture of dependency. The
reactors were merely the most recent in a long chain of government subsidies
that they had engineered.
If the communities that apply for reactors are among the most
dysfunctional, the reactors degrade them further still. Young families disappear.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Dengen sanpo kofukin jisseki [Subsidies Under Three Electricity Acts], Mar. 31, 2016.
Available
at:
http://www.city.kashiwazaki.lg.jp/atom/genshiryoku/kofukin/kofukinjisseki.html
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Unemployment rises. Divorce rates climb. And although the government
transfer payments are massive, they are also irregular.
To maintain their level of income, the towns apply for another reactor.
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Table 1:

Plan
Construction
Operation
Revenue PC
Under 15 PC
Over 64 PC
Unempl't PC
Marriage PC
Population
In-migr'n PC
Out-migr'n PC
Divorce rate
Sources:

Selected Summary Statistics

n
54,002
54,002
54,002
54,001
54,001
54,001
54,001
54,001
54,002
26,129
26,007
53,916
See text.

Min
0
0
0
161.0
.043
.037
0
0
0
.002
.005
0

Mean
.00046
.00085
.01068
509.7
.170
.190
.031
.005
71477
.039
.043
.289

Median
0
0
0
387.8
.166
.179
.028
.005
26685
.035
.040
.266

Max
1
1
1
11843.3
.353
.572
.179
.031
3688773
.322
.369
4.00
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Table 2:

Determinants of Municipal Revenue (Full Sample)

Dependent variable:
Plan
68.59
(106.94)
Construction
256.30**
(104.30)
Operation
438.93***
(170.89)
Under 15 PC
Over 64 PC
Unemployment PC
Overall R2:

.09

Revenue PC
6.65
(71.55)
272.38***
(103.63)
425.14**
(166.61)
2472.89***
(335.10)
2892.01***
(182.09)

.
15.87
(71.75)
275.93***
(106.65)
432.79***
(167.80)
1991.45***
(315.08)
2928.78***
(174.72)
-3743.10***
(744.87)

.26

.29

Notes: n = 54,001. Fixed effect regression with year
and municipality fixed effects, and errors clustered by
municipality. ***, **, *: significant at 1, 5, and 10
percent levels. Standard errors in parentheses.
Sources:

See text.
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Table 3:

Determinants of Population (Full Sample)

Dependent variable: Population
Plan
-3481.6*** 730.56
(580.1)
(2928.9)
Construction
-2780.8*** -2157.4
(674.8)
(1325.9)
Operation
-7907.8*** -6254.4***
(1002.8
(1361.1)
Under 15 PC
-74243.3***
(12015.6)
Over 64 PC
-159999.8***
(11173.3)
Unemployment PC
Overall R2:

.0003

.09

1153.1
(2115.4)
-1994.8**
(968.4)
-5904.0***
(1123.9)
-96296.9***
(13468.2)
-158315.7***
(11007.6)***
-171461.3***
(29957.9)

.

.09

Notes: n = 54,001, 54,002. Fixed effect regression
with year and municipality fixed effects, and errors
clustered by municipality. ***, **, *: significant at 1,
5, and 10 percent levels. Standard errors in parentheses.
Sources:

See text.
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Table 4:

Determinants of Age Distribution (Full Sample)

Dependent variable

Under
15 PC
Plan
-.0125***
-.0101***
(.0037)
(.0015)
Construction
-.0242***
-.0223***
(.0048)
(.0043)
Operation
-.0142**
-.0124**
(.0065)
(.0055)
Marriage PC
-1.754***
(.1519)
Unemployment PC
-.4873***
(.0333)

Over
64 PC
.0321*
(.0190)
.0151**
(.0062)
.0169***
(.0062)

Overall R2:

.45

.66

.61

.
.0322
(.0203)
.0142**
(.0065)
.0162**
(.0066)
-3.814***
(.3426)
.1071
(.0708)
.50

Notes: n = 54,001. Fixed effect regression with year
and municipality fixed effects, and errors clustered by
municipality. ***, **, *: significant at 1, 5, and 10
percent levels. Standard errors in parentheses.
Sources:

See text.
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Table 5:

Determinants of Unemployment (Full Sample)

Dependent variable:
Unemployment PC
.
Plan
.0044
.0064
(.0062)
(.0070)
Construction
.0042
.0091
(.0036)
(.0088)
Operation
.0040
.0272**
(.0045)
(.0133)
In migration PC
-.0379*
(.0223)
Out migration PC
.1150***
(.0152)
Overall R2:
n:

.48
54,001

.24
26,007

Notes: Fixed effect regression with year and
municipality fixed effects, and errors clustered by
municipality. ***, **, *: significant at 1, 5, and 10
percent levels. Standard errors in parentheses.
Sources:

See text.
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Table 6:

Determinants of Divorce (Full Sample)

Dependent variable:
Plan
-.052
(.048)
Construction
.057*
(.031)
Operation
.018
(.030)
Under 15 PC
Over 64 PC

Divorces PC
-.061
(.034)
.061*
(.034)
.017
(.032)
.451***
(.099)
.451***
(.062)

Unemployment PC
Overall R2:

.31

.31

.
-.065
(.049)
.059**
(.026)
.013
(.026)
.723***
(.094)
.431***
(.061)
2.119***
(.286)
.36

Notes: n = 53,916, 53,915. Fixed effect regression
with year and municipality fixed effects, and errors
clustered by municipality. ***, **, *: significant at 1,
5, and 10 percent levels. Standard errors in parentheses.
Sources:

See text.
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Table 7:

Pref.
Niigata
Fukui
Fukushima
Fukushima
Shizuoka
Fukui
Saga
Ehime
Kagoshima
Fukui
Fukui
Miyagi
Shimane
Hokkaido
Ibaragi
Ishikawa
Fukui
Ibaragi

Town
Kashiwaz.
Ooi
Fuk. 1*
Fuk. 2**
Hamaoka
Takahama
Genkai
Ikata
Sendai
Mihama
Tsuruga
Onagawa
Shimane
Tomari
Tokai 2
Shiga
Tsuruga
Tokai 1

Reactors
7
4
6
4
4
4
3
3
2
3
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1

Reactor Complexes

Power
821.2
471
469.6
440
361.7
339.2
229.8
202.2
178
166.6
151.7
134.9
128
115.8
110
54
28
16.6

Began
operation
1985-97
1979-83
1971-79
1982-87
1976-93
1974-85
1978-94
1977-94
1984-85
1970-76
1970-87
1984-85
1974-89
1987-89
1978
1993
1991
1966

Notes
Decommissioned
Partially decom'd
Partially decom'd
Partially decom'd
Partially decom'd
Partially decom'd
Partially decom'd

Experimental FBR
Decommissioned

Notes: Power in 10,000 kW.
* Located in Futaba and Okuma.
** Located in Naraha and Tomioka.
Sources: Gensuikin, Nihon no genshiryoku hatsudensho
ichiran [Survey of Japanese Nuclear Reactors] (effective
July 1997). Available at:
http://www.gensuikin.org/data/genpatuichiran.html
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Table 8:

Determinants of Municipal Revenue
(Matched Sample)

Dependent variable:
Plan
25.23
(104.53)
Construction
221.38**
(103.23)
Operation
374.33**
(179.50)
Under 15 PC
Over 64 PC

Revenue PC
33.49
(72.21)
299.26**
(112.22)
431.53**
(183.03)
3929.67**
(1905.98)
1644.91*
(921.70)

Unemployment PC
Overall R2:

.19

.21

56.59
(60.72)
308.50**
(113.08)
461.12**
(192.48)
3100.79*
(1723.33)
1495.03*
(845.30)
-5173.15
(845.30)

.

.22

Notes: n = 961. Fixed effect regression with year
and municipality fixed effects, and errors clustered by
municipality. ***, **, *: significant at 1, 5, and 10
percent levels. Standard errors in parentheses.
Sources:

See text.
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Table 9:

Determinants of Population (Matched Sample)

Dependent variable: Population
Plan
-667.49
1520.62
(1600.23)
(2358.97)
Construction
-332.65
-57.137
(1589.09)
(2787.34)
Operation
-2408.56
-2168.06
(3519.79)
(4219.97)
Under 15 PC
-37683.63
(78022.74)
Over 64 PC
-94413.35**
(44673.68)
Unemployment PC
Overall R2:

.04

.14

1570.06
(2294.16)
-37.38
(2762.35)
-2104.74
(4002.49)
-39457.25
(83045.22)
-94734.05**
(45148.8)
-11065.19
(101498.5)

.

.14

Notes: n = 961. Fixed effect regression with year
and municipality fixed effects, and errors clustered by
municipality. ***, **, *: significant at 1, 5, and 10
percent levels. Standard errors in parentheses.
Sources:

See text.
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Table 10:

Dependent variable
Plan
Construction
Operation
Marriage PC
Unemployment PC
Overall R2:

Determinants of Age Distribution
(Matched Sample)
Under
15 PC
-.0142***
-.0105***
(.0042)
(.0021)
-.0253***
-.0221***
(.0048)
(.0045)
-.0188***
-.0137**
(.0062)
(.0057)
-1.047
(.825)
-.594***
(.1647)

Over
64 PC
.0288
(.0197)
.0130*
(.0072)
.0100
(.0090)

.57

.50

.59

Notes: n = 961. Fixed effect regression with year
and municipality fixed effects, and errors clustered by
municipality. ***, **, *: significant at 1, 5, and 10
percent levels. Standard errors in parentheses.
Sources:

See text.

.

.0296
(.0209)
.0129*
(.0075)
.0104
(.0104)
-3.003**
(1.353)
-.0335
(.4202)
.55
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Table 11:

Determinants of Unemployment (Matched Sample)

Dependent variable:
Unemployment PC
.
Plan
.0059
.0061
(.0062)
(.0069)
Construction
.0055
.0089
(.0037)
(.0094)
Operation
.0084*
.0276**
(.0047)
(.0133)
In migration PC
-.0295
(.0858)
Out migration PC
-.0050
(.0515)
Overall R2:
n:

.47
961

.05
463

Notes: Fixed effect regression with year and
municipality fixed effects, and errors clustered by
municipality. ***, **, *: significant at 1, 5, and 10
percent levels. Standard errors in parentheses.
Sources:

See text.
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Table 12:

Determinants of Divorce (Matched Sample)

Dependent variable:
Plan
-.051
(.047)
Construction
.066*
(.035)
Operation
.027
(.033)
Under 15 PC
Over 64 PC

Divorce Rate
-.045
(.048)
.074**
(.033)
.032
(.032)
.261
(.573)
-.076
(.375)

Unemployment PC
Overall R2:
n:

.37
961

.36
961

.
-.056
(.043)
.070**
(.033)
.019
(.030)
.634
(.577)
-.009
(.334)
2.327*
(1.180)
.43
961

Notes: n = 961. Fixed effect regression with year
and municipality fixed effects, and errors clustered by
municipality. ***, **, *: significant at 1, 5, and 10
percent levels. Standard errors in parentheses.
Sources:

See text.
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Table 13:

Date
1611
1793
1896
1933
2011

Major Earthquakes and Tsunami
in Northeastern Japan

Magnitude
8.1
8.4
8.0
8.1
9.0

Epicenter
N39.0 E144.4
N38.5 E144.5
N39.5 E144.0
N39.2 E144.5
N38.3 E142.4

Tsunami
.
15-25 meters
4-5 meters
28.7 meters
38.2 meters
38.9 meters

Sources: J. Mark Ramseyer, Why Power Companies Build
Nuclear Reactors on Fault Lines: The Case of Japan, 13
Theoretical Inquiries L. 457 (2012), T. Usami, Nihon higai
jishin soran, [416]-2001 [Materials for Copmprehensive List
of Destructive Earthquakes in Japan, [416]-2001] (2003); T.
Utsu, et al., eds., Jishin no jiten [Encyclopedia of
Earthquakes] App. II (2d ed., 2010); Utsu, Nihon fukin no
M6.0 ijo no jishin oyobi higai jishin no hyo: 1885 nen 1980 nen [Table of Magnitude 6.0 or Higher Earthquakes Near
Japan and of Earthquakes Causing Damage], 57 Jishin
kenkyujo iho 401 (1982).
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Table 14:

Earthquakes Causing Deaths, 1800-Present

Year

Magnitude

Deaths

Fukushima:
1821
1938
1978
2008
2008
2011

5.5-6.0
7.5
7.4
7.2
6.8
9.0

1+
1
1
1
1
1,613

Niigata:
1802
1828
1833
1847
1961
1964
2004
2007
2007

6.5-7.0
6.9
7.5
7.4
5.2
7.5
6.8
6.9
6.8

19
1,400
5
12,000
5
13
68
4
15

Fukui:
1891
1948
1961

8.0
7.1
7.0

12
3,728
1

Source: Jishin chosa kenkyu suishin honbu, Todofuken
goto no jishin katsudo [Earthquake Activity by Prefecture]
(effective 2012).
http://www.jishin.go.jp/regional_seismicity/
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Table 15:

Domestic Coal Production in Japan

Production
5,110
5,011
3,833
1,860
1,810
1,645
798
632
296
132

1963
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2007
Notes:

Workers
122.8
107.1
47.9
22.5
18.3
14.3
4.7
2.6
1.3
0.6

Production in 10,000 tons; workers in 1000 people.

Source: Keizai sangyo sho, Waga kuni sekitan seisaku
no rekishi to genjo [The History and Circumstances of the
Coal Industry in Our Country] 5 (2009). Available at:
http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/category/resources_and_fuel/co
al/japan/pdf/23.pdf
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Table 16:

1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000

Employment in the Fukui Textile Industry

Workers
52,342
59,463
62,091
50,645
48,378
42,326
36,922
32,124
25,440

Source: Tomizawa, Shushin, Fukui sen'i sanchi no kozo chosei shi
[The History of Structural Adjustment in the Textile Region of Fukui],
Keiei kenkyu, 56: 17, 25 (2005). Available at
http://dlisv03.media.osakacu.ac.jp/infolib/user_contents/kiyo/DB00011775.pdf

Ramseyer: Page 41

Table 17:
A.

Fukushima
1980
Naraha
8366
Tomioka
14941
Ookuma
9296
Futaba
8017

1985
8422
15895
9988
8219

1990
8322
15861
10304
8182

Population Declines

1995
8476
16033
10656
7990

2000
8380
16173
10803
7647

2005
8188
15910
10992
7170

2010
7700
16001
11515
6932

Oth towns
Cities
B.

Fukui

Tsuruga
Mihama
Takahama
Ooi

1990-2010
%change
-7.5
+0.9
+11.8
-15.3
-12.4
-0.1

1980
61844
13036
11818
9156

1985
65670
13384
12310
9791

1990
68041
13222
12425
10598

1995
67204
12362
12201
10251

2000
68145
11630
12119
9983

2005
68402
11023
11630
9217

2010
67760
10563
11062
8580

1990-2010
%change
-0.4
-20.1
-11.0
-19.0

Oth towns
Oth cities

-7.7
-0.7

C.

1990-2010
%change
-7.9
-13.1

Niigata:
1980
Kashiwaza. 95892
Kariwa
5346

1985
97638
5502

Oth towns
Oth cities
Sources:

1990
99265
5522

1995
2000
101427 97896
5702
5028

2005
94648
4806

2010
91451
4800

-10.5
-3.6
See text.

Ramseyer: Page 42

Table 18:
A.

B.

C.

D.

Fukushima
Naraha
Tomioka
Ookuma
Futaba
Fukui
Tsuruga
Mihama
Takahama
Ooi

Fraction of Population 65 or Older
25.0%

25.9
21.1
21.0
27.1
25.2%
23.1
29.2
26.6
27.8

Niigata
26.3%
Kashiwazaki 27.2
Kariwa
26.5
Japan
Note:

23.0%
Population data as of 2010.

Source: Nihon chiiki banzuke [Regional Rankings in
Japan] (2016). Available at: http://areainfo.jpn.org/index.html
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Table 19:

Town
Ooi
Kashiwazaki
Takahama
Mihama
Ookuma
Kariwa
Tsuruga
Tomioka
Naraha
Futaba
Kawauchi
Hirono

Pref
Fukui
Niigata
Fukui
Fukui
Fuk'ma
Niigata
Fukui
Fuk'ma
Fuk'ma
Fuk'ma
Fuk'ma
Fuk'ma

Electricity Generation Subsidies

National
subsidy
2,483
1,823
1,858
2,238
2,084
1,042
1,116
1,060
989
769
-

Pref'l
subsidy
555
844
671
16
211
112
14
13
45
45

Total
subsidy
3,038
2,668
2,528
2,254
2,084
1,253
1,228
1,074
989
782
45
45

Pop'n

$ Subsidy
PC
.
8,200
$4,258
86,200
$356
10,500
$2,767
9,800
$2,644
11,500* $2,082
4,700
$3,064
68,400
$206
16,000*
$771
7,700* $1,476
6,900* $1,302
2,028
$255
4,300
$120

Note: The last column converts the total subsidy to dollars, at
the 87 yen/$ rate effective on December 31, 2012. Amounts in million
yen, as budgeted for 2012.
* As of 2010; currently uninhabited; Naraha currently has a
population 976.
Source: Zenkoku zenchiiki no dengen ritchi chiiki taisaku kofu kin
banzuke [Ranking of All Areas by Subusidies to Electricity Generating
Areas], in Nihon chiiki banzuke, accessed 11/29/2016. Available at:
http://area-info.jpn.org/PowerGrantAll.html#area182028

